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SECTIO~ 1 
SUr-tHl\RY OF INSTRUMENT PER.t"'ORMl\NCE 
GUIDA~CE 
Whi h' the Princeton Exper f,ment Package (PEP) was gatherinq ste t tal." 
data, the pointing was maintained by centering the stellar image on 
the slit jaws of the exporiment using the Fine Error Sensor (FES). 
To ensure that the guidance char~.cteristic~ ,,-ere simi la.r over the 
ranqtlt of stellJl\r brightnesses observed, the high volt~ge of the Fi:!1S 
was 1etermined by an automatic gain control (AGe) that ~epended on 
st.e l tar m4q'nit,llde. Duritlg t't1e r:-ds'S ion, $tars bet,\'Ieen •. t . 5 ann 7,0 
visual magnitude ware regularly observe~. 
The 6xperirnent was dGsignedwit.htwo different 91.d.dJ!lnce tubes that 
cou ld be operated I!·~par~te ly ortoget:;"ner .Th", channe 1 1\ configura-
tion (guidance tube A) was designed as the primary system an~ w~s 
used during the first. 5 years of operation exce9t wh~," faint targets 
we-Ire observed. The channel C configuration (guidance tube B) was 
equipped with an operational amplifier to allow successful guidance 
ern rainter stars and was used occasionally during this time. Because 
of suspected oporational problems with channel A, beginning at orbit 
27683, channel C was used exclusively until the final end of mission 
(EOH) tests that proved that there had been no malfunction in guid-
ance tube A. Configuration B was a hybrid using both guidanoe tubes 
and was only used for brief tests. 
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Table 1-1 1,ists tlle or.bits during which the different tubes were 
usen. During tha intervals liste1 in Table 1-1, exp9riment qui~~nce 
d~ta (guin~~ce settle ti~e, pitch and yaw error vottages, nnd ~GC 
values) were collecte1. These 1~ta were tabulate~ ~long wit~ the 
time of observation and target data to monitor the guidance perform-
ance. The stellar visual magnitude was plotted versus AGe tor 
observations in intervals o~ about 1 year. ~GC values can vary 
because o.f many tal:tors such as stray light, location in orbit, 
pointing; etc., which J:l'!sult in considerable scatter in the plots. 
Table 1 ... 1 
List of Orbits anq Guidance Channels 
orbit No. .a.GC-Channel I)ata Collected 
0-12849 ~ 
. 
12850-13506 I c Complete 
13507-14943 A 
. 
14944-15438 C Complete 
15439-16117 A 
16118-16165 C Complete 
16166-17254 ~ 
17255-17522 C Complete 
17523-27682 A 
27683-44861 C (27683-34583) 
44862-44890 ~ Complete 
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, , 
Those data \.,ere therefore fit by te(lst squares straight lines for: 
each year. Figure 1-1 shows these fitten tines for sets of channel 
C data acquired during the 3rd and 6th years of o,?p.ration. 
The plot shows the distribution of visual magnitudes up to about 7th 
magn,itude. The lines plotted are only for those visual maqnitudes 
between 1.5 and S. 5 since this is the reg ion where most of the d-t·,i'l 
were obtained. These two lines are the "best fit" for 0 and B stars 
only. The first tine corresponds to orbits 12850 through 17478, and 
the second tine corresp<;>nr.is to orbits 27613,) through 33105. Chl'lnnet C 
was used for both ~ets ,'f ':lata. 
The upper limit or faintest visual '''I1agnitude that could be observen 
depended on the spectral typefl of the star. The hotter stars <e.g., 
o and B stars) had a fainter timitinq magnitude. From the straight 
tine fit to the data, a theoreticat limiting magnitude corresponding 
to the maximum allowable AGe (8.6 volts) can be determined. Table 
1-2 sumn~arizes this limit as a function of spectra 1. type for orbit'S 
27693-33105 ("1ine 2"). 
An inspection of Figure 1-1 allows an estimate of the guidancp. 
~ystem's degradation from the ~~d to ~eh year of operation (tines 1 
and 2, respectively). Comparing Lines t and 2 shows that, for a 
given magnitude, a higher AGe was required to run the guidance 
system during the 6th year than during the 3rd year. Brighter than 
1-3 
'.O~------·--------------------------------------------------~I 
o.a LIN. 1 - ORIITlI1z.G.n_711 11.1 < VMAG < lUI t1 < 1.1 
LIN. Z .. ORIiTlIZ7IU-3S1C13I (0.1 <VMAOI <1.1, t1 < 1.1 
LIN! 1 
.,~~~----~------~------~~------~------~------~~-------U IA 
Figure 1-1. AGC-C versus Visual Magnitude 
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Table 1-2 
L~nits for Predicted Visual Magnitude ~t Saturate~ 
AGe-C Vol.tage 
Pre~icte~ 
Sp~~tral AGe-C Y Slope Visual. 
Clalu Saturated Intercept:. VM'~G va. AGC-C ~aqnitud".! 
0 8.6 V -1.36 0.97 7.0 :0.4 
B 8.6 V -1.39 0.93 f;.6 :0.3 
A 8.6 V -2.41 0.99 6.0 
P ~.6 V -1.79 0.C)1 ... 5.7 
. 
G 8.6 V "2.'39 0.97 -5.5 
K 8.6 V -2. :~'8 0.95 ,.,4. '3 
~ 8.6 V Insufficient Data 
visua 1 magnitude 4.5, the dif~.,rence is not statist,ical ly signifi-
(~antJl '2'0t' the faintest stars, 4 loss in sen!!litivit~' of about. 0.5 
magnitudes had occurred. No appreciable degradation in the F~S was 
observed in the last 2 ye~r. o~ the satellite's operation. 
In normal operation, whon the AGe exceeded 3.6 volts, the PES auto-
matical1y returned control to the spacecraft's inertial reference 
unit (IRU). It was possible to override this limit using a mo~e o~ 
opl!ration c~\lled t.he f01r:ced switch option (PSO), which used the 
onboard processor (OBP) to monitor the stability of the guid"1nce. 
The FSO extended the ability of the PES by about 1.0 magnitude over 
the limits listed in Table 1-2. The F~O operational mode was di~-
continued August 31, 1979, when the OBP failed. Later, when some 
1-5 
OBP funct.ions had been rf1.!overetl, t.he FSO was useless bec.~use r,)f t.l1e 
loss of spoct.rometer sensitivity (see Section 2). 
OV9r a period of more t.han 8 ye~~s, t.he guidance syst.em in t.h9 PEP 
performed beyond expectation9. The overall guidance sensitivity 
degt'aded very littlf! and equalled or surpassed all prlS11.aunch preclic-
tiona. 
.' 
SPECTROMETER/TELESCOPE 
Throughout. the mission of the PEP, bot~ spectrometer ca~riages 
performetl at nominal des ign specification. ~o m~(:hanicl\ 1 anom'l lies 
were ever lloted. Before the OAO,,.C launch, c3.rriaqe ~ was discovered 
t.o have a Low-rate leak in its sealed tead-scr9w bellows assembly. 
This was considered, 'however, to have litt.le consequence over the 
ant.icip4tad l-year lifetble of t.'he PEP, and a decision was made to 
continue wit.h launch preparation~. 
The cotm\anded carriage motion. was extremely pretlict.able, and 4\11 
deviations from expect.ed behavior were t.raced t.o etectremic 
glitch •• , operat.ional progratm\ing errors, or a lack of understanding 
of the nonst.andard operat.ion of t.he carriage motion control sub-
system (special programs, configurations, et.c.). 
The stat.ic position indicat.ors for both carriagea possessed a known 
inherent ambiguit.y that occasionally result.ed in a scient.ific <"tata 
loss because of incorrect interpretation of the carriage position 
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IStatus by operat-lons personnel. On savera t occasions, the earri-!\ges 
were a ho ina{lVertent ty conunandfld to pos it. i.ons 'blllycmd t.heir norma 1 
range'S of travel, but in each instancllt, the el'!ctric;:tl limit. switcll-
es were activated, and the motion of tlle carriages was halted before 
any physical st~p was met. 
The obscuration pattern of carriage l sensors by the carriage 2 
collection mirror was determined early in the mission, and this 
effect was included, when necessary, in the observing programs. 
Stray t.ight. entering tlle vent p(')rts of the far-TJV sensors was also 
recognized as a pr.~blem. Th';iI effect was much rer.iuced by judicious 
operations progr~ms and ~ata reduction correction p~ocedure9. 
The carriages were always operated in the closed-loop mode. In an 
attempt to isolate the causes of unscheduled .',cgeriment high-voltage 
shut.downs and redundant unit switching, carrige motion controller C 
was placed on-line for a period of about 1 month in early 1978. 
Frequent I!~ju.tment of the carriage -positions by rel!l-time command-
ing was necessary during t.his int.erva l. This was not. tiue to any 
irregular behavior of the carriages, but. was caused by the opera-
tions programs not. having been designed to handle t.he more complex 
motion of controller c. 
REDUND~NT tJNIT~ 
During the lifetime of t.he PEP, deliberate configuration changes 
Were kept t.o a minimum. The most. common configuration adjustment. 
1-7 
was switching t.he ot.-line low-voltago l;)ower sut'ply (tNPS-r.. tol from 
-B or ... e). This .witchin" was done t.o take advanta90 of t.he 
increased sensit.~Jity provided by the FES QP~T-a el.ectronics an~ w~s 
use1 for viewin9 faint objects. Such special. viewing periods span-
ned several week. before revert.ing to LVPS-~. Tn!a latter unit 
included an rES protection override feature and was used whenever 
possible. 
Our,ing thefir.t. few mi.sion years, the DHVPS's were normally not 
cycled, and a pair of the thre., available units were 'cept on contin-
uousl.y. An increase in unschedule1 OHVOS shut.10wns commancinq in 
late 1977, however. required a revision of this basic oper~tin9 
philosophy_ In early 1978, the OHVPS's were turned on only during 
act.ual data-takin,] interv.als, and I,)nly t.hose sensors requi~ed by the 
part.ic'l11ftr observing program were used. 
In an att.empt. t.o isolate a pos.ible cause for the frequent dat.a 
high-voltage shutdowns and spurious unit. switchir.g experienced 
during thQ foregoing p.~1od, various units were tested on-line. 
This procedure yielded no suspect. units. 
During an LVPS-C to LVPS-A swit.ching change in the winter of 1978, 
status displays and unexpected spacecraft. motion indicated 1058 of 
the PEP ;uidance function in channel A. LVPS-C was quickly returned 
on-line and remained in t.hat .tate until contact 44856 Santiago. An 
end-of-mi •• ion checkout. of LVPS-A (FES channel A) indicated nomtnal 
guidance performance (no failure). 
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T~e only necess~ry swiechin~ ~ecause of failure involved the 
sequence controller (~C) function. sc-~ ~nalo9 ~~t~ rate Bwitchin9 
relay w~s stuck in t~e l?-eecon~ mod~: ~C-B fail~~ ;urinq t~~ occur-
rence of an extensive glitch anti did not responQ to subs'9quent lion" 
commantis. 
Thus, exceDt for se-c, the final on-line configu~ation of t~e PEP 
was the .ame a& its immediate post launch configuration. 
2!JICAL P!RFORM~SCE 
The overall performance of the floptical" system (mirrors, p~oto­
tubes, and associated electronics) was within expecteQ limits for 
the fir.t 5 years Qf the mission. Shortly after launch, telemetry 
indicated that the secondary mirror had not positioned itself 
9roperly. A check of the image size and sl'tape in orbits 168-170 
showed the ima9~ to be in focus. It was concluded that the sec-
ondary mirro.r wae po.itioned correct ty and that the te lemetry was 
bad. A second oheck of the image size was performed in orbits 
35250-35260 and showed no significant change in the image. A third 
set of image data obtained dur~':lg the last month of the mission was 
lost. It. is believed, however, .... hat the i",age si~e and shape were 
maintained throughout the mission. 
Tht! only major change in performance occurred in the experiment 
far-UV sensitivity. Ourinq the first 5 years of the missinn, the 
decline in instrument sensitivity was silni lar to that predicted 
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before launch: the l~rgest 1ecline occurreQ the €irst year with the 
"hort;~9t w<!Lveler,'3ths being the most af€ecteti. Besinning near orbits 
25000-3000(), the decline in sensitivity ~ccel~r~te~, 1ropping by a 
factor of 5 in 1 year, with the largest decline occurring at the 
middle, rather than shortest, wavelengths. This 1eclin~ continued 
throughout thE~ remaining 3 years of the mission. Investigation of 
the cause for this decline is still under way. The best explanation 
at t.his time is that the dec line is due to contamination of the 
optical surfaces in the spectrograph by an unKnown material. The 
onset of the rapid sensitivity degradation in 1977 co~respond~ to 
the onset of solar maximum, suggesting that a process similar to 
that found in the Television Infr~red Observation Satellite (Tiro~) 
is working (Reference: Tiros Project Memo of October 12, 1 19). 
Details of the decline in sensitivity can be found in Section ~. 
No failure of any component in the optical system was recorded 
during the mission. ~ll six phototubes a\"ld their associated elec-
tronics were functioning at termination. 
V TUBES (FLU0!ESCENCE AND SF) 
The near-UV photomu.l. tiplier tl1bes (Vl t V2, and '113 j are coverecl by 
wirldows made of MgF 2. The pa,;lJsage of cosmic rays and .othel!' high-
energy particles through these windows causes the tubes to ,rec~rd 
very high background count rates. The backgrou~ld is .,I)mposGd of 
a pZ:'imary "short-term" component and a aecondary "long-term" 
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phosphor.scence com~onent. The primary component. is a photoelectron 
burst. of durat.ion :sO .125 lutcond caused by the passage of a 0091\\ic 
• 
ray through thl! window mat~ria 1. 't'he secondary component or phos-
phorescence is due to the accumu1ateli damagl' to the windows by 
repea~ed passage of energetic particles. 
since the primary compon.nt of the background is a short (SO.12~ 
second) burst. and these bursts are separat.ed in time by approxi-
m".tely 0.5 second, they can be e timinat.ed by samp ling the photo-
multiplier counting register at a rat.e hiqh enough to disc:riminat.e 
against the cosmic ray burst.s. The m,u',imum rate at whieh the OBP 
can be commanded is 0.12'5 second, which is sufficient fo1:' distin-
guishing the time of bursts. Counting registers 1 and 3 Can be 
sampled at the 0.l2S-second rate, but only tubes VI and V3 can be 
assigned to these registers. Consequently, V2 cannot be sampled at 
the 0.12S-second 1:'ate. 
An observing program, calleti the "short frame" p1:'ogram (ta~en from 
the fact that only a p~rtial data frame is stored eve~y 0.125 sec-
ond), was initlat~d in 1975 using the Vl photomultiplier tube and 
the 0.12S-second sampling rate. Because the sampling rate is 112 
times more rapid than the nonna1 14-second rate, t!'Hl avai lable 1=If( of 
data storage becomes fu 11 aft .• r only a.poroximately 4 minutes of fiata 
taking. Since there are normally only t'll·t;:) or three contact, per 
orbit in which the data can be transmitted to the ground, short 
frame data taking is fairly inefficient. However. in many cases; it 
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.1!\ L Lowf'lr:t observations to be m;!\('le th<\t otherwise cou td not be obtliil1ed 
in thu or1inary 1ata-ta~ing mode. G~neratlY~ the ordinary mode w~s 
usefu t on ty whf;!n observing stl\rs that \~~re bri..,ht enough so th"lt the 
9teLtar signat was much larger than the background. 
PO''lER SUPPLY' 
Copernicus was launcned with three OHVPS's and three LVPS'!S. ~t the 
end of. i~he miss ion, a II II ix power supp lies were function inc; • The 
only anomaly to occur involved the OflVP~ and g'l.itches (unscheduled 
r"!configurations). Beginning in the first year' after t'lunch, con-
figuration changes of the re~undant units, data registers, entrance 
siit, guidance package, and the oower supplies would spontaneously 
occur. From the very first glitch (orbit 131), the OHVPS was sus-
pected as a cause. The glitches were rare (a few per year), and 
attempts to explain them met with unsatisfactory results. They wer/! 
considered essentially random events that could not be avoided. 
Late in 1977, the glitch problem became sC!vere. The OHVPS w'ould 
shut down many tim •• per month (sometimes many times per day), 
stopping data gathering and, at times, putting the spacecraft into 
an unsafe mode. The glitches seerned associated with the OHVPS and 
groBs solar activity, but untit 1979, no way was found to avoid 
them. ~t that time, a Illitch ~voidance Scheduling Procedure (GASP) 
was instituted, virtually halting the glitches. ~n~lysis of the 
glitch data appears to absolve the DHVPS as the direct cause of the 
glitchl!s. They are, however, a significant part of the glitch. l\ 
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glitch is thought to occur as follows: a power surge occurs some-
where in the sp~cecraft and is Qateceed by the DHVPS. Protection 
circuitry shuts down the DHVPS, propagating the surge through the 
system, thereby altering the status of Sup90rt electronics. One 
DHVPS, unit 8, experience1 a change in protection circuit.ry in lq7~. 
After shutting down, it would turn itself partially on. DHVPS B was 
noted to be less sen~itive to the power surges than ~ither DHVPS A 
or C. 
Details of the glitches and their effects on the mission c"n bl'! 
found in Section 2. 
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SECTlv~ 2 
M~LFU~CT!O~S ~ND ~ESULT~~T IMP~CT 
MECK~~IC~L F~ILURrf2 
The few failures that occurred within tne ~EP di~ not compromise or 
severely limit its basic scientific mission. These failures are 
itemized as follows: 
a. Secondary Mirror/Focus Mechanism 
During the immediate post launch checkout of the PEP, status 
data indicated incomplete uncaging of the telescope's 
secondary mirror/focus mechanism assembly. $uhsequent data 
analyses suggested failure Qf the telemetry monitor circuits 
and not of the uncaging operation. 
~n attempt to change the telescope focus in orbit was also 
unsuccessful. Position status data of the second~ry mirror 
implied that no motion was produced by commandin(~. aecause 
the final focus adjustment prior to launch was calculated to 
include the effects of the launch environment, the telescope 
was believed to be near best focus. Image ~hape tests 
confirmed this status. End-of-mission attempts were made to 
move the secondary mirror, but again, no motion was observed. 
b. Calibration Lamps 
Post launch checkout of the calibration lamps conf.irmed launch 
survival and no significant changes in the sgectrometer 
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wavelenqth c~libration. The lamps were infrequentlY used 
thereafter. During a special series of observ~tions ~bout 
one third into mis'3ion '!.1fetime, however, both lamps failed 
to operate. End-of-mission attempts to iqnite cftlibration 
lamp ~ were unsuccessfuL. 
c. Sequence Controllers ~ and B 
Sequence controllers ~ and B were the only failed PEP elec-
tronic units at end-of-mission. SC-A ~D transfer rate relay 
failed in the I6-second mode. This occurred within the first 
half year of the mission. Tests ma~e with the unit in~icate~ 
that the 16-second analog data store rate was effectively 
suppressed with the electronic data-handling equipment (EDHE) 
in its store cycLic mode. ~t the same time, PEP digital data 
continued to be stored at its asynchronous rate (i.e., one 
digitaL blOCK every 1/4 spacecraft-minute). Thus, t~is unit 
could have be~n placed on-line in the event of failure of 
both SC-B and SC-C. SC-8 went off during a severe glitch in 
early 1978 and failed to respond to subsequent turnon 
commands. 
SENSITIVITY DEGRADATION AND EFFECTS 
The principal malfunct'ion in the PEP was the rapid decline in t~e 
far-UV sensitivity. The deci~ion to terminate the spacecraft was 
based partly on the loss of far-UV sen~itivity. Figure 2-1 shows 
the relative sensitivity of the high-re'solution far-UV phototube Ul 
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from orbits 100 to 44000. In the first 25000 orbits (S years), the 
decline was c lc.ISf! to that predi.cted before launch. ; rapiti (i\P-
p.t'ox'\.mi\tety C;O pe'l:'cent) tiecline i\t shorter wavelengths '..,as 
ex'!?eriem:erl during the first year follo\'1e1 by smaller df!clines in 
subsequent years. ~t longer wavelengths" the decline was more 
gradui\l and reasonably constant (approx:;~mately 10 to 15 percent per 
year) through the first 25000 orbits. 
After orbit 25000, the character of the decline was significan.t:.ly 
different. ~t the shortest wavelengths «1000 A), a ~low decline 
continued until termination. At the mi1dle wavelengths (1000 to 
1300 A), a dramatic decline occurred. Between orbits 30000 and 
35000, the sensitivity of the U1 tube decreased by a factor of 2.25 
at 1100~. By orbit 40000, another factor of 5 was lost. Thus, in 
10000 orbits, more than a factor of 10 was lost. ~t longer wave-
• Lengths (>1300 A), the decline was not as rapid (a factor of 4 in 
10000 orbits), but it was larger than that observed before orbit 
25000. 
The low-resolution far-UV phototube U2 exhibited a behavior similar 
to that of Ut. The only significant difference was that during the 
period of rapid decline (orbits 25000-44000), it showe1 a greater 
decline than Ul. The U2 wavelength dependence was similar to that 
of Ul. 
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The near-fJV phototubes, Vl and V2, did not exhibit the r~pid r!ecU.ne 
seen in the far-UV 9hototube. They r.1isplayed an initialrapir'l 
decline follower! by ~ much slower decline until the end of t~e 
mission. At orbit 25000, both Vl and V2 were at approximately 70 
percent of their launch sensitivity. By orbit 44000, they stilt 
retained 60 percent of their sensitivity at launch. 
Clearly, something occurred between orbits 25000 and 30000 that 
greatly affected the sensitivity of the far-UV phototubes. This is 
also the period in which glitches began to occur in ahun~ance 
(Section 2). This suggests that the two matfunctions ~ay hav~ the 
same cause or that the sensitivity decline was somehow caused by the 
effects of the glitches. 
W. L. Upson II has been conducting an analysis of the sensitivity 
loss, which is nearing completion. His preliminary results will be 
presented, and a full report will follow at a later date. 
The initial decline in sensitivity, orbits 0-25000, is similar to 
that seen in other devices. The cause is thought to be primarily 
due to the decay of the photocathodes. The rapid r.lectine occurring 
after orbit 25000 is, however, quite anomalous. In"'/estigations 
conducted shortly after the onset of the rapid d~cline absolved the 
power supplies and other control units as the ca\~se of the sensi·,.. 
tivity loss. This le~t only contamination of the optical surfaces 
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and/or photocathodes as the cauue of the decline. This suspicion is 
further supported by the fact that U2 showed a greater decLine than 
Ul (U2 undergoes one more reflection than Ul). 
At the same time that Copernicus was e~periencing this rapid decline 
in sensitivity, Earth sensors on Tiros-N, ~OAA-A, and 50/1 were also 
note& to display significant sensitivity losses. Analysis revealed 
. , 
that their sensitivity loss was due to contaminants on the optical 
surfaces. The contaminants came from outgassed material reacting 
with atmospheric oxygen to produce polymers. The increased solar 
activity in 1977 raised the mean density of oxyg~n in the upper 
atmosp,hera and caused the polymer production to increase dramat-
ically (see report from Tiros Project for detai~s). 
Analysis of the data suggests that a similar reaction may have 
occurred in the PEP. The most likely location for the contaminant 
is in the spectrograph. Ample materials exis~ for outgassing, and 
the spectrograph is open to space so that atmospheric oxygen can 
enter (direct observation of oxygen atoms confir'lls their increased 
abundance at the altitude of the spacecraft in 1978 through 1981). 
Ul and U2 show greater dec~ines because of the peculiar absorbing 
properties of the contaminant. The peak absorption appears to occur 
between 1050 A and 1150 k. U2 shows more loss because the incoming 
light undergoes ar, extra reflection to enter th(! phototube. Further 
analysis is cont.inuing. A final report on the decline and possible 
causes will be issued when the analysis is complete. 
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The impact on Copernicus operations caused by thp, loss of sensitiv-
ity was to lengthen all observations. Programs were run several 
times to set the data quality obtained with a sinqle run befor~ 1977. 
IMP~CT OF V TUBE FLUORESCENCF. AND SHORT FR~ME 
. 
~s explained in Section 1, the bacKground levets in the near-
uttraviolet tubes (V1, V2, V3) were much larger than expected. It 
has been determined that passage of energetic particles (cosmic 
rays, particles, etc.) through the windows covering the tubes 
causes a short-term fluorescence and a lonq-term phosphoresr.en,:e. 
The sum of these two components results in a backqround count r~te 
of approximately 7000 counts/l4 seconds in V2 and approximately 
10,000 counts/14 seconds in Vi. Therefore, Vl and V2 were u8~~ul 
only for fairly bright stars, where tne stellar siqnal was much 
larger than the background. With tne a"vent of the short fr'.lme 
program in 1975, the Vl tube began returning higher quality data. 
However, short frame observations required the use of the OBP 
(except for the teChnique implemented in 1980, whereby the space-
craft was commanded f~om the ground). From 1975 to 1980, the oa~ 
had numerous mi.nor failures and three major failures. The major 
failures resulted in the OSP being it~':hi)erable from ~,?ril 8 to ~ugust 7, 
1977: ~ugust 30, 1978 to June 26, 197q: and Jllne '0 to October 3, 
1980, a total of 17 months. 
GLITCHES AND GA.SP 
Unschodu1ed reconfigurations (glitches) of the Princeton Package 
have occurred since orbit 131. These glitches have ranged from very 
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minor events (re~ist~r reassignment and commutator steps) to events 
rnajor enough to greatly en~anger the spAcecr~ft. ~pproKimately 260 
glitc~p.~ were recorded in the 45000 orbits of the mis~ion. T~e 
incid~nc~ of glitches in the first 5 years (25000 orbits) was very 
tow, ~ few £ler yeat'. The impact on op~ra~ ions was very sma t l, data 
loss being the only lasting effect. 
aeginning near orbit 27000, glitches became much more common: 
80 percent of ~ll glitches have occurred since orbit 27000. The 
impact of this high rate of glitches was twofold: first, ~ substan-
tial amount of data was lost. This required rescheduling observa-
tions, but in some cases resulted in permanent scientific data 10s5. 
Second, the danger to the spacecraft was greatly t";lcreaaed. The 
only hard failur~ of a major PEP unit occurred during one such glitch 
(Section 1). Given these factors, every effort was made to identify 
the cause of the glitches and to establish a metbod by which they 
could be avoided. 
The Clnset of gLitcht'i"z in late 1977 suggested a connection with solar 
activity. An initial cheCK of the data seemed to support this, but 
as more glitches occurred, it was determin9d that solar activity was 
not the trigger. Various other glitch avoidance techniques were 
tried, but none seemed t~ work. In early 1978, an analysis con-
ducted by E.L. Wilson showed that most of the glitcltel3 ~iere occur-
ring when the telescope was pointed in the plane of the orbit near 
the point where the spacecraft is approaching the target at maKimum 
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velocity. Figure 2-2 present, the orbit~l l~titu~~ 1istribution of 
the glitch targets; Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of gLitnhes 
with position in th. orbit. 
Using these two correlations, the Glitch Avoidanc~ Sche~uling Pro-
cedure (GASP) was developed. The GASP involved scheduling observa-
tion., as much as po.sible; to occUr when targets were greater than 
40 degree. from t.he orbit.alplane. When this was not. possible; t.he 
high volt.ages were t.urned off r.!uring the period of high glitch 
probability (+30 to +120 degrees as shown in Figure 2-2). The GASP 
was made operat.ional on A9ril 1, 1979. Immediately, almost all 
glitches stopp4!d. The onty gtitches that occurred after that time 
were due to either relaxinq the C~SP requirements (to obtain more 
observing time) or human error in implementing t.he GASP. The only 
impact. that t.he implementation of the G~~P had on operations was to 
reduce t.he observing efficiency, since part. of the orbit could not 
be used for dat.a taking. 
Analysis of the glitch dat.a has failed to i1entify a specific cause 
for t.heir occurrence; however, many things have beel1 learne1. No 
connect.ion was found bet.ween glitches and t.he Eart.h's latitude or 
longit.ud~, spacecraft day or night, or short-term solar activity 
(flares, storms, etc.). No single electronic unit was identified as 
t.he source of t.he problem. The similar behavior of all the glit.ches 
implies t.hat. the cause may be in the spacecraft or a global event 
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Figure 2-3. Orbital Latitude Distribution of Glitch Targets 
(i.e., affecting all Princeton units). The triqger for a glitch 
must be ~9sociated with the ~ensity of th~ earth's atmos9here. Th~ 
increase in glitche~ in l~te 1977 corralates welt with the onset of 
significant soll\r activity. Solar activity wilt cause the earth's 
atmosphere to expand, thus increasing the mean density at the alti-
tude of Copernicus. The occurrence of glitches I\t the point of 
maximum velocity toward the target supports the idea that the 
Earth's atmosphere ia the ultimate cause of the glitches. The point 
of maximum velocity toward the tarqet is also the point a~ which the 
maximum RAM pressure is exerted on the spacecraft. The strong or-
bital latitude depend~nce supports this conce9t: glitches occur 
onLy when the open end of the telesc0ge is ~ointe~ in the direction 
of the spac8craft motion. 
A glitch is thought to occur as follows: as the spacecraft 
approaches the glitch point, the power levels in the Princeton 
Package become unstable. Shortly after this, the high-voltage 
protection circuitry senses a power change an~ shuts down the high 
voltage. This in turn produces a transient in the system, and other 
units may be atfected. A glit-ch has occurred. 
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OBSERVATIONS 
MILESTONES 
SECTIO~ 3 
ORBtT~ OBSERVP-TtONS AND OPERATtONS 
The milestone tables contain a chronologiaal listing of all space-
craft slews and observational targets with their respective execu-
tion times. Other information is also included such as the orbit 
number of ~ata storage ~umps, the astronomical sequence list (~SL) 
name of the observation, and the beta and theta angle of t~e 
spacecraft during the observation. The milestone tables appear in 
~ppendix A (which is available upon request). 
TESTS 
Throughout the operational lifetime of the spacecraft, many tests 
were performed, as can be seen in the milestone tables. ~ detailed 
discussion of all tests would not be appropriate to give here. 
However, the tests genera l ly were two typ~~: s ignal te~'ts and 
configuration tests. Signal tests were performed o~ relatively 
faint targets to determine the counting rates in the photomultiplier 
tubes or the guidance tubes (i.e., the AGe value). Configuration 
tests were performed to determine which units, c~annels, etc., to 
use while Observing. 
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SPECIAL OBSERVATIO~S (SHORT FRAME) 
Short frame observi'!ltions '::c:r'! conducted in t.hree di ffarent. way'3: 
a. Commands were st.ored in the ORP and were execut.e~ at. t.he 
appropriat.e time. The resulting dat.~ were st.ored in dat.a 
storage and were retayedt.o the grounti by the wideband Qr 
narrowband transmitter. 
b. Commands were st.ored in t.he oap ann 'were executed so that 
data w~re being obtaine~ during contact with ground stations. 
The data were not stored, but were sent in real time to the 
ground station by the narrowband transmitter. This method of 
operation was called the "real-time" snort frame method. 
c. Commands were sent t.o the spacecraft from the ground at the 
same rate as t.he OSP commanding rate. This technique was 
initiated in August 1980 and was used when the ORP was 
nonoperational. This method was calted the "real-time ground 
command" short frame method. 
The preceding paragraphs point out that, during short frame ob-
servations, full use of the NASA ground station network was needed. 
However, lack of network su~port at these stations resulted in the 
loss of approximately 25 percent of the requested observing time. 
Before 1979, most of lost support was due to conflicts with the 
International Sun-Earth Explorer (ISEE) series of satellites. 
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St:.art.ing in June 1 c)79, the pt'iority fot' A',ort .frame observatJ.ons was 
raised subst~ntia tty, al1d these I?t'obtt'lllns subsir't~f'} somewhat:.. Durinq 
t:.'I,is t:. ime, ''\Pl'roximata ly 1 S to 20 percent o~ the requested cont~ct: 
support. was denied, mostly because of conflicts with t.he the High-
Energy Ast.ronomy Observatory (HE~O) and the So tar P>1aximum ~iss iOt' 
( SMM) • 
OPERATIONS 
DATA LOSS 
OAO-3 Copernicus operated at an t'Jfficiency of 97.8 percent through 
it.s 44890 orbits of life. A total of 1001 orbit~ of scientific data 
were lost. The largest single source of data loss was problems with 
the experiment (17 percent, 166 orbits). This was. followeri by 
Net.work-induced losses (15 percent, 146 orbits), ~uman error (13 
percent, 132 orbits), and spacecraft problems (13 percent, 127 
orbits). The remaining data toss was due to many small problems 
(solar eclipse, low-lead time, failure to acquire target, ~tc.). 
CONSOLE ACTIVITY 
During the operational lifetime of the Copernicus satellit.e, the 
performance of the PEP was monitored continuously (~uring spacecraft 
contacts) at the PEP console. Commands were sent to the spacecraft. 
from t.he console to correct carriage positions, turn on an~ off data 
high-voltage pO\tler supplies, use different re~undant units, change 
operat.ional configurations, and prot.ect the package after gtitc~es. 
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Commanding activity at the PDP consot~ is recorded in the Grumm~n 
~erospa~e Corpor~tion (GhC) consQle logboOK and t~e PEP console 
logboOK. Both of thes~ logboOKs were stu1ie~, and a chronological 
list of all commands sent trom the PEP console was tabulat~~. ~ 
study of the sequence of activities at the console reveals five 
fairly distinct operational phases that the spacecraft encountered: 
• Orbits 1-2000--This was the ~irst year of operation and was an 
operational development phas~. 
• Orbits 2000-12000--This was a fairly activ~ period of command-
ing, mostly to correct scheduling error~. 
• Orbits 12000-27000--A very calm period for problems. Most of 
the commanding was the result of planned test9. 
• Orbits 27000-35000--This was a very active period for command-
I , 
ing because of the high frequency of glitches. 
• Orbits 35000-44890--A fairly calm period for commanding. The 
occurrence of glitches was virtually stopped by implementing a 
new observing procedure. 
Following is a more detailed dlscussion ot each of these phases. 
Figure 3-1 graphically displays the console activity throughout the 
mission. 
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Orbits 1-2000 
The orbital range is the period in which the PEP was turned on, 
tested, and put. into operation. The fir~t PEP command WIiS sent. in 
or'bit S6. Commanding continuer! at a high rate through orbit 2';6. 
~fter that point, comman1s were sent primarily t.o correct carriage 
positions and to remove the effect.s of minor 9litc~es. By orbit 
2000, the commanding rate was reduced to the rat.e that would be 
held for the next 10000 orbits. 
Orbits 2000-12000 
During this period, the rate of rea t-time commands f.rom the consote 
was fairly high--the average being about. 3 commanrling contacts 
~ contact.s at which commands were issued) per 100 orbits. Techniqu.es 
for gen$rating schedules had not. been developed to the point of 
being error free. Consequent ly, 70 percent. of the cOlTlmands sent 
from t.he PEP console were to correct scheduling error~. At this 
time, most console operat.ors did not have much experience in real-
time commanding from t.he console. Therefore, relatively many mis-
takes were made, which had to be corrected wit.h further commands. 
These console opera·tor errors were the cause of about 30 percent of 
t.he commanding during this period. 
Orbits 12000-27000 
This was a period of ver~1 tittt~ console activity other than during 
planned testing. Beginning around orbit 14000, the short frame mode 
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of data acquisit.ion was tested, whic'l-\ require1 some real-t.ime com-
mahding. Guidance offsf!t and gain test.s were a1.so run from the con-
so 1.e to study t.he possibi lity of viewing f~int obj ects. In C\drH-
t.ion, some unplanned real-time commanding was necessary as a r~sutt 
of planet.ary ann other special observations. Toward the end of this 
period (orbits 20000-27000), console act.ivity fell to a very low 
level of less than one commo!,nd per 100 orbit.s. 
Orbits 27000-35000 
~ dramat.ic increase in the frequency of glitches caused a corres-
ponding increase in console activity during this period. Real-t.ime 
commanding initially reached an all-time high of 55 commands per 100 
orbits, as hiqn-vottaqe supplies and redundant un~ts were simply 
commandeci back to the original configuration after a gU.tch. Later, 
in an at.t.empt to prevent the glitches, various change~ in operating 
procedure were tried, most requiring some console activity. One 
such swit.ch in the use of a redundant. unit. caused frequent carriage 
problems, which then required additional real-time commanding. 
Eventually, the data high-voltage power supplies were cycled on and 
off each orbit coinciding with observation periods. ~t first. this 
was done in real t.ime from the console, but then later it was 
incorporat.ed int.o the scheduling procedure. This greatly reduced 
the frequency of glitches, but. it was not until the institution of 
the ~SP, beginning around orbit 35000, t.hat they were virtually 
eliminat.ed. 
Orbits 35000-44890 
This was a fairly quiet p~r.iod for oonsole aotivity as a result of 
instituting the G~~P teohnique. By taking into ~ooount the 1PBcific 
orientation of the spacecraft 1uring an observation, an a~propriate 
hi9h-voltag~ turnon ti,me oould be found 90 as to avoid a glitch. (1\ 
more detailed desoription o~ this prooedure can be found in seotion 
2 of this report~) However, there oontinued to be a small number of 
soheduling .rror. and qlitohe., whioh were responsible for most of 
oommands sent in real time from the oonsole. 
'180 during this period, more observ,\tions were conrlucted in the 
short frame mod. beoause of the deolining sensitivity of the in-
strument. The partiaL failure of the OSP, however, led to a real-
time short frame worker that required oommand support from the GI\C 
oonsole. 
'dditional real-time oommanding was indirectLy a result of the 
deolining priority of OAO. Many oontacts were lost to higher 
priority satellites during this time, ~nd ocoasionally this resulted 
in the loss of all memory load points. This oaused the e~eoution of 
the coast hold sequence, wh;,ch then necessitated some r~{tl-time 
commanding before being able to return to normal operations. 
Late in the life of O~O, there was muoh oonsole activity because of 
end-of-mission testing. This is discussed in ~etail elsewhere. 
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SCHEDULING PROCtOURES 
The Princeton Experiment Package schedulin~ procedure (Figure 3-2) 
involved the use of the following four programs: 
SLEWER GD_-The SLEWE~ program performe1 the calculations for a 
change in spacecraft attitude. 
~CD_-The purpose of the ~SL program was to convert the w~ve­
lengths requested by the astronomer into the appropriate carriage 
motion commands. These carriage motion commanris were then uS"!d ,~9 
input to the ~V~TAR program. 
~~ (i)<2>®--AV~TAR was the basic scheduling program. It was 
used to updat~ the Network Computing SUP90rt ~ection (NETCO~S) and 
orbital elements and to generate timelines and schedules. 
!2!E. Cit-The TGIF program was use1 to chec'\( the accuracy of the 
sc~edules before they were released to G~C for further processing_ 
In addition, the program produced a cLealr, reariabV! command list, 
w'tich was later used in monitoring the ~Itatus of thet experiment 
packag~. 
The first step in sche1uling an observation was to update the 
NETCONS and orbital elements.CO This was performed once every l to 2 
weeks. ~e time and duration of forthcoming contacts and the most 
recen.t values of orbital parameter~, as determined by NAS~, were 
input to ~V~TAR for later use in generating schedules. 
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When the NETCO~S and orbital elements were updat~d, a survey was run 
to disptay orbital and ta~get ooouttation inform~tion.CD This was 
used in determining input to the ~ohenuling program suoh as when to 
begin soheduLing obs.,rvations ann where to speoify an "open ll contaot 
(i.~., no observation during the oontaot so that data ~torage oan be 
dumped and ~he status of the experiment pao~age oheoked)., Addition-
al input to the soheduling program was gener~ted by ASL.CD Given the 
ooordinates of the target, the day of observation, and the velooity 
of the target as Sgeoified by the astronomer, A.SL produoed a de ok of 
oards oontaining all required oarriage motion oomman~s. 
The final step before running sohedules was to determine the spaoe-
oraft slew to the new attitude and the time required to oomplete the 
"lew. By inputting the coordinates of the oLci and new at.t.itude and 
the time that the slew was to begin, the SLEWER p~ogram produced the 
needed info~ation.~ 
At this point, a sohedule was run, fitting all required carriage 
motion commands into the Observation time available.aD Additional 
neoessary oommands, suoh as data storage on and off oomman~s, were 
generated by the program as well, and a listing of the commanding 
sequenoes was printed. This output was then manually modified using 
a disp l.ay st.at.ion.<Ii> Changes were made to make oommanding more 
effioient, to oorreot errors in the sohedule resulting from oon-
straints of the soheduling program, or to insert any other oomm~nds 
needed, suoh as a spaoeoraft. slew. Onoe t.hese ohanges were made, a 
TGIF was run.(1) 
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Tho TGIF program performed checks on the modifie~ schedule to find 
errors either previously overloo~ed or generated white ma~ing 
modification~. It t.hen li!Jted ~ll erro\.'s founoi ~lnd printe1 out t"e 
schedule in its currlJnt form. The schedule was Ino,';Ufied again to 
correct. errors~ the pro~ess repeat.ed as necessary. 
Once t.he errors had been removed, the schedule was released to G~~ 
to be merg.d wit.h spacecraft commands and University College of 
Lo~~mt (UCL) experiment. commands, and lat.er it was used as input. t.o 
t.he Normal Operations Program (~OP).~ The NOP performed addit.ional 
checks t.o ensure proper commanding, and, if no errors were found, 
print.ed a list.ing of all commands and t.heir t.imes of execution. 
This listing (t.he "contact message") was given to the PEP office to 
be checke~ for accuracy,~ and, if t.here were no problems, it was 
approved for further processing by G~~ and eventual t.ransmission 
t.o t.he spacecraft..~ 
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~IERAL DESCRIPTlQ.! 
S}!:CTION 4 
SOFTW~RE DESCRtPTION 
The primary har~ware configuration used by the PEP Operations Group 
at the Goddard Space Flight Centor (GC;PC) was the ~1&DO-G2, an IBM 
Syst.em 360 Model 65. The operat.ing syst.em at. project t __ rminat.'lon 
was 360/65 OS/MVT Release 2t.9 in conjunct.ion with H~SP II, Version 
4.0. This final configuration had 512 kilobytes of primary storage, 
1024 kilobytes of main storage, and 4096 kilobytes of large cap~city 
storage. Secondary st.orage facilities included two IBM 2314 D~SF 
units and a complement. of IBM 2401-series tape units. An IBM 22~O 
Display Sta.t.ion and an laM 029 card punch were located in t.he PEP 
Operat.ions Group Office. 
All special and product.ion programs were execute" in the batch mode. 
Use of the 2260 Display Station was limited primarily t.o tlte modifi-
cation of PEP observing schedules. 
A. cOlnplete description of th~ computing environment is provided in 
"Mission and Data Operations, IBM 360 User's Guide," Volume I, J. 
Balakirsky, Code 531, December 197~. 
The operations programs used by the PEP Operations Group consisted 
of several frequently used major programs and a complement of minor 
ones. The latter were developed to handle special sit.uations an" to 
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ext.nd t:.lla capl1bi li ties of tho major product:.ion progratt\s. J\ltnouqh 
somo scient.ific ctata reductiotl rout.illes \~ere used, the princio(\ 1 
purpose of the softwftr~ system w~s to create PEP observin1 programs 
and to expertite this creation proceos. 
The major components of t.he PEP software package Wf!lr8: 
• ~VA.TA.R 
• SF'''' (alilis.s: J\TROCIT~ and 08AFGK~) 
" 
SLEWER 
• AUGUR'" (alias: 'FUTURE. TI~iELI~E) 
• ASL (a tias: CGP) 
• TGIF (alills: XPEp) 
• PREDICTOR 
Functio'na t descript.ions of these programs are as fot lows: 
AVATAR 
A.Vl\T~R was the prime schedule-generat:.ing program of the PEP opet'a-
tiohS activity. It.s main funct.i.ons were (1) to create PEP observing 
schedu 1.s given a specified t.arget. &nd a set o~ PEP c\omm~nds and (2) 
to updllte a collection of data set.s used in t.his creat.ion process. 
}\. third, infrtrquently used, funct.ion of this l:?rogram \~l!\S to provide. 
listing. of 30me of these schedule-retated data sets. To accomplish 
t.hese taSKS, thr •• AVATAR funct.ions were availl!\bl~: TtMELI~E, 
UPDATE, and OUTPUT. Each of t.hese funct.ions had several modes t.hat 
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performed a particular task within its parent function. The valid 
fl.lnc:t.i.onal modes for each of t.he t.hree main functions are listed in 
Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 
Valid Functional Modes 
TIMELI~E UPDA.TE OUTPUT 
, 
SURVEY SUN SUN 
SCHEDULES MOON MOON 
SUMMARY NETCON NETCO~ 
BETA.ROLL ORBITI\L ELEME~TS ORBITA.L ELEME~TS 
DID 
Q.1TZ 
COMMANDS 
The names of the functional modes listed above for function UPDA.TE 
indicate the kinds of data cont.ained in t'lle nata sets used for 
schedul~ creation in the TIMELINE i!unction. NETCON, for example, 
maintained data pertaining to the NI\SA. groun1 stations, which were 
available to the OA.O-C spacecraft. 
The chief purpose of the TIMELINE function was to provide soacecraft 
environment information and PEP target occyltation information over 
a specified period of time (mode SURVEY) and, if directed, to gen-
erate a PEP schedule based on this information and on a list of PEP 
commands required to accomplish a particular scientific objective 
(mode SCHEDULE). 
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The spacecraft/target data previouely mentioned were gener~tly 
calculated at intervals of 1 spacecraft-minute and inclu~ed the 
following items: 
~ Whether or not the spacecraft was in contact range of a ground 
station, an~, if so, the ground station identity 
• t~ether the spacecraft was in orbital day or in the Earth's 
shadow 
• '~ether the spaQecraft was in a region of the South ~t:.lantic 
Anoma ly (S~A) 
• Whether the specified target was unocculted or occulted by the 
Earth, and, if occulted, what was the type of occultation. 
Much of this information could be made available in tabular form. 
Each of the foregoing conditions and subconditions, however, was 
given a special identifying comput.er-print.al)le character. By 
concent.rating the symbols for each condit.ion int.o a single line ann 
by includj,ng a line representing time, a veJ;"y useful graphic display 
was obtained. Th:\s di~~l·'y was called a "timet!ne." It. was pro-
duced by alt functional modes of the ~IMELI~E function exc~pt 
BETAROLL. That mode produced a table containing spacecraft. beta 
angles and optimum roll angles for multiple targets over a period of 
1 year. Mode SUMMARY produced a t.imetine that included no t.arget 
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occultation da,t;". Mode SURVEY produced a complet:.e t:.imeline includ-
ing multiple target occultation lines on multip,le target input. 
Mode SCHEDULE, the workhorse, pro1uced a complete time line for a 
single target and extra lines indicati.ng the type of motion being 
executed by the PEP carriages. 
The SCHEDULE mode had many options to control the method by which it:. 
op~rated on the PEP command lis~ to produce an observing program. 
It aLso automaticalLy inserted PEP FES request and settle time 
commands at the beginning of each (unoct;mlted) PEP observing inter-
val. Termination commands were simila~ly inserten. 
\\~he many options of AVATAR avail"ble to the ~perations group made 
this pro9ram a potent operation$ tool. 
SFW 
The Short Frame Worker (Spw) pro9ram was derived from AVA.T~R and was 
used to schedule short EDHE frame observations. Because of t:.~e 
rapid rate at which the spacecraft dat" storage was filled during 
the execution of such a worker, special techniques, not provided by 
AVATAR, were needed to efficiently create SFW observing schedules. 
Input to the SFW program consiste1 of specialLy encoded commands 
describing the type of worker (,s;;:an data or background), the sta~':'t­
ing time of the worker, and at whieh time the stored data were to be 
transmitted to a ground station. 
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Output inclutieti a timeline (as described for A.VI\T~R) anti the SFti 
observing schedule. Many spacecraft group commands were included in 
this output.. Insertion of these commanris was done i\utomatically by 
the SF'1l program. 
Even with this output, extensive manual modification of the initial 
observing prolJram was. requited. This was frequently 1ue to loss o't 
ground sta't.ion support, and modifications were necessary to maintain 
the scientific objectives of the observations. 
SLEWER 
The purpose of this program was to generate. efficient spacecraft 
target-to-target slewing sequences for input into the PEP opera-
tional schedules. 
Basic input to this program included the initial and final space-
craft pointings and the time of initiation of the slew. Initial and 
final spacecraft roll angles could be optionally specified. J?oint-
ing data were assumed to be at Epoch 1950, and these data were 
transformed by the proqram to pointi'ngs at epoch of date. Opt.ion-
ally, these pointing transformation operation~ could be suppressed. 
Specific slew legs from a given pointing could also be inputted. 
For each target-to-tat"get input request, the program generated a set 
of 24 possible 3-le9 slewing sequences. This orocedu.re and other 
OA.O slewing-related items are described in "Mathematical A.nalysis 
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for the Orientation and Control of the Orbiting ~stronomic~t Obser-
vatory Satellite," P.s. Davenport, NAS~/Langley, 1963 G-29Q. 
The program then determined the 3-1e~ slewin9 sequence that woul~ be 
selected by the OAO-NOP. The selecting rule wa~ to use that tri~d 
whose largest slew leg was ,matler thAn the largest slew leg of any 
other triad. This special slewing sequence was then checked to 
ensure that no iipacecraft slewing restrictions would be violated. 
Most important among these restrictions were limits on the maximum 
length s lew leg (40 de9rees for.' P and Yr 20 degrees for R) and the 
maximum allowable deviation of the spacecraft from optimum roll at a 
particular beta angle. 
If any restriction was violated, the program wouln atte~pt to find 
an acceptable slew among the remainin9 triads, suggest an initial 
specific slew that would create an acceptable triad, or, at worst, 
calculate a midpoint between the specifien targets and comp'ute two 
sets of slews. 
Slew timin9 data for acceptable slews were also ~rovinen by this 
program. 
AUGURY 
This program was used to obtain target timelines for observations 
t.hat migh'l: occur beyond t.he current. range of networ'lt contact data 
provided by the Mi •• ion and Data Operations (M&DO). 
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Input to the program generi'llly consistatl of the curr'!!nt set of OAr) 
orbit.al elements, t~rget positions, ground station lonqitUlies "1nd 
l~titudes, SAA siz~, ~un and ~oon position~ ov~r the range of 
applicability, start of timeline data, and duration of. ti~eline. 
The output consisted of a modi fieri ti.!'!le line dist'lay with the 
timeline(s) presented on an orbit-by-orbit basis for the input 
target(s) spacified. Inform~tion related to each orbit was also 
d isp ~~. 'yed I inc 1 ud ing Greenwich mean time (GM",,) of ascend ing node, 
OAO mission orbit number, ground station contacts, and Princeton 
University orbit class. ~ s9acecraft p.lapsed tim'!! (SET)/GMT table 
W"1S also included for each orbit. 
This output enllbted operations personnel t.o determine the observing 
efficiencies of future proposed Observations or other useful 
information. 
ASL 
-
Th~ purpose of this program was to generate a set of high-level 
symbolic language-type PEP carriage motion commands from basic 
wavelength-based data. These latter data, ASL, were generally 
written by a scientific investigi'ltor for a specific target or set of 
targets. It specified the various combinations of carriage motion 
(scan routines) desired ~t designated wavelengths. This information 
was then translated by the ASL program .~.~lto the higher level col'1tmand 
language required by the OAO-NOP. 
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~long with the ASL data, input to this program ineluded t.arget 
position, approxim~te day of observation, and a target velocity. 
The output included a listing of the generated high-level co.rnmanris 
an1 a corresponcUng card deCK that could be directly inputteti into 
AV~TAR, the main scheduling program. 
Embedded in the output listing were tne carriage positions an~ 
wavelengths at insertion of each command and at regular intervals 
during th*ir execution periods. It also indicate~ the occultation 
status of the carriage 1 senSOrs because of the carri~ge 2 COllec-
tion mirror. This program acted, in effect, ~s a carriage motion 
simulator. 
The tftsic output of this program (symbolic commands and their 
execution times) was processed by another independent ~rogram 
(TESTOR). This program calculated carriage positions on a command 
basis and compared its results with tnose obtained by the ASL 
program. ~ny di fferences found were f tagged, and the d iscrepal,\cy 
investigated. This cheCK was considered necessary since the 
carriage motion and requisite timing was complex and the basic J\.SL's 
were often written by astronomical researchers who were less 
familiar with these problems. 
TGIF. 
This program was us~d to verify the accuracy of the PEP schedules 
after their r:re~tion (mo.st often by ~VATAR) and after their 
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subsequent manual modification using the IaM 22~O Display Station 
Functions. 
Input to this program consisted of: 
• The name of the schedule to be processed 
• The PEP carriage positions and ON/OFF status of the PEP 
'OW/PSls at execution of the first PEP command within the 
schedule 
• A title generally indicating tlte schedule's name, the 
target( s)., and program( s) that the sch".!dule included 
The output of ~his pro9r~m included diagnostic messages indicatin~ 
record format errors, out of sequence records, errors in PEP command 
timing, and attention flags for various events. The. output format 
was eaaily readable, and it enabled operations personnel to deter-
mine at a glance when special event,s were to occur, whe.n the PEP/FE.S 
was enabled, when the dual-halt condition was present in the PEP 
electronics, th~ positions of the PEP carriages at insertion of each 
PEP cormnand, and the ON/OFF status of the DHVPS IS. 
Release of a PEP schedule to ~c for further processing did not 
occur until the output of this program w&s found to be acceptable. 
In addition, it was used to check spacecraft command memory and was 
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used by PEP console operators in the OAO-OCC F.or reat-time status 
referonce. 
PREOICTOR 
The purpose of this program was to provide information relating to 
various target pointing p&rameters that were needed in pr~planning 
observations. 
The program produced a t~bular history of these ~arameters tor 
. 
var'iou. standard pointings, USUa t lyon a daily ba3is over a 
specified period of time. These parameters included tat'get orbit"l 
longitude and latitude, beta angle and spacecr~ft optimum roll 
angle, and Moon target angular separation. Information on an actual 
target was obtained by interpolation of these t~butated data. 
Actual targets whose position indicated an orbital latitude between 
+40 and -40 degrees, for example, were considered for data high-
voltage shutdown, and their scheduling was postponed or special 
techniques (e.9., GA.SP) were used when gerlerating their observing 
schedules. Other parameters indicated when high spacecraft pitch/ 
yaw wheel speeds might be expected, when the Moon was too ctose to a 
potential target, and when the beta angle exceeded 90 degrees. 
This program was a valuable aid in planning the PEP target observing 
sequence. 
4~·ll 
OTHER EtROGRAMS 
~~il. the bulk of the scheduling function was gerformed by AV~T~R 
and tho" other pro9rams previousLy ·ies~riberi, s!,eciat observing 
problems and nor~aL evolution of operations re~lJirp.n the develo9ment. 
of additional software. 
Ouring the finaL operations era, for exampLe, the beginning of a P€P 
ob.erving int.~al was oft.~ delayed beyond the point at which th. 
target became unocculted, the normal ~V~TAR start t~e of obs.rv~­
tion. Instead of modifying ~VAT~R, the p~ogram w~~ instructed to 
intro~uce a large, precalculated, FES settling time, ~n avait~bl~ 
~V~T~R option. This del~yed actual scientific observing until 
the de.ired start time. Another program, operating on the AV~TAR 
output, modified the FES settling periods to their normal 2 
spacecraft-minute. and inserted data high voltage on and off 
cormtand~. 
Manipulations as described were not uncommon, and much of this 
additional software was directed to reducing the manual effort 
required to .ha~ an AVATAR-generated schedule into final form. 
Given all the vagaries of the schedulinq proces~, a single pro9r~m 
to handle all observing requirements wouLd DIS exceedingLy complex. 
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